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Breaching and Entering
WHEN DATA SCRAPING SHOULD BE A FEDERAL
COMPUTER HACKING CRIME
“No foreign nation, no hacker, should be able to shut down
our networks, steal our trade secrets, or invade the privacy of
American families . . . .”1
INTRODUCTION
In July 2015, hackers known as the Impact Team
breached AshleyMadison.com and threatened to expose the
private lives and extramarital affairs of over 30 million users.2
This hack was just one of many; indeed, within the past two
years, Americans have seen a huge increase in the number of
large-scale data breaches. In November 2014, hackers made
global headlines when they exposed media conglomerate Sony’s
confidential company data.3 Between February and March of
2014, the global retailer eBay, which has over 148 million
accounts, suffered a major data hack that it did not detect until
May of that year.4 In April 2014, hackers attacked AOL,
compromising the email addresses, passwords, and contact lists of
120 million users.5 In mid-2014, hackers seized the private
financial information of 76 million households and 7 million small

1 President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2015),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/20/remarks-president-state-unionaddress-january-20-2015 [http://perma.cc/57PL-HSDU].
2 World’s Biggest Data Breaches, INFORMATION IS BEAUTIFUL (Aug. 11, 2015),
http://www.informationisbeautiful.net/visualizations/worlds-biggest-data-breaches-hacks/
[http://perma.cc/BU4J-4PL8]; Ashley Madison Users Face Threats of Blackmail and
Identity Theft, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/28/
technology/ashley-madison-users-face-threats-of-blackmail-and-identity-theft.html
[http://perma.cc/DE67-Q3WT].
3 Brooks Barnes & Michael Cieply, Sony Cyberattack, First a Nuisance, Swiftly
Grew Into a Firestorm, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/31/
business/media/sony-attack-first-a-nuisance-swiftly-grew-into-a-firestorm-.html?r=0 [http://
perma.cc/3EQJ-LE9M].
4 Jose Pagliery, eBay Customers Must Reset Passwords after Major Hack, CNN
MONEY (May 21, 2014, 2:53 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/05/21/technology/security/ebaypasswords/index.html [http://perma.cc/6HDV-SWTU].
5 Id.
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businesses that used JP Morgan.6 In August 2014, up to 200
photographs of celebrities were hacked and posted on the website
4chan.7 And in September 2014, Home Depot suffered a data
breach that resulted in the theft of 56 million of its customers’
credit card numbers.8
The recent proliferation of data hacking underscores the
need for robust antihacking laws to effectively punish data
hacking criminals. Yet as society becomes adept at using the
Internet for numerous beneficial purposes, it is necessary to
ensure that such laws clearly distinguish between criminal
computer hacking and permissible uses of the digital realm.
The need for clear antihacking legislation is not new. Data
hacking first became a federal concern several decades ago. In the
early 1980s, during the nascent years of the Internet, Congress
began to recognize that computer hacking posed novel threats to
national security. Congress enacted the first legislation to combat
computer fraud in 1984. The act, known as the Counterfeit Access
Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CADCFAA),9 created
criminal sanctions for the unauthorized use of computers.10 In
proscribing computer fraud and the use of counterfeit access
devices in the same act, Congress likened computer hacking to
the crimes of credit card fraud and identity theft.11 But while
existing laws were directed only at perpetrators of credit card
fraud, the CADCFAA targeted computer hackers.
The CADCFAA described “hackers” as individuals who
could “access (trespass into) both private and public computer
systems, sometimes with potentially serious results,” and who
could “access and control high technology processes vital to our
everyday lives.”12 Although these phrases indicate that Congress
6 Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Matthew Goldstein & Nicole Perlroth, JPMorgan
Chase Hacking Affects 76 Million Households, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2014, 12:50 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/02/jpmorgan-discovers-further-cyber-security-issues/
?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=1 [http://perma.cc/2ERF-KDUK].
7 Fay Strang, Celebrity 4chan Shock Naked Picture Scandal: Full List of
Star Victims Preyed upon by Hackers, MIRROR ONLINE (Oct. 10, 2014, 10:00 AM),
http://www.mirror.co.uk/3am/celebrity-news/celebrity-4chan-shock-naked-picture-4395155
[http://perma.cc/HGR2-HBBF].
8 Melvin Backman, Home Depot: 56 Million Cards Exposed in Breach, CNN
MONEY (Sept. 18, 2014, 5:56 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/09/18/technology/security/
home-depot-hack/ [http://perma.cc/DJ3U-NXF4].
9 Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2190 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2008));
H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 21 (1984).
10 H.R. REP. NO. 98-894.
11 “[T]here are indications of a growing problem in counterfeit credit cards
and unauthorized use of account numbers or access codes to banking system
accounts . . . .” Id.
12 H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 10 (1984); Counterfeit Access Device and
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984.
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was beginning to understand the nature of computer hacking, the
phrases’ generality demonstrates that Congress only had a
rudimentary framework to define this new type of crime.13 To that
end, the CADCFAA only prohibited the hacking of certain types of
information, such as matters concerning national security, foreign
relations, and financial credit.14 It also only applied to select
computers, such as those that were operated for or on behalf of
the government15 or those that belonged to financial institutions
and contained financial records.16 Moreover, shortly after enacting
the CADCFAA, Congress separately passed the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA) to prohibit other
computer crimes, such as wiretapping.17 As a consequence of all
these limitations, the CADCFAA’s scope was quite narrow.
In 1986, Congress passed the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act (CFAA), which proscribes more conduct than the CADCFAA.18
Since its ratification, a large number of cases have been brought
under the CFAA. The diversity of cases, their mixed outcomes,
and the evolution of hacking since the passage of the CFAA
demonstrate that the definition of computer hacking is still
unsettled. While certain conduct—such as intentionally releasing
worms that cause massive secured computer networks to
crash19—closely embodies the traditional concept of data hacking,
other conduct—such as creating fake MySpace accounts in order
to harass teenagers—less clearly constitutes hacking.20 Much of
this uncertainty is due to the novel ways of engaging in Internet
communication, such as through social media, which did not exist
when the CFAA was enacted.
13 While drafting the Act, the House discussed the difficulties that arose
because much of the intangible property involved did not fit well into traditional
categories of property subject to abuse or theft. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 9-10.
Additionally, the House specifically noted that the criminal justice system at the time
was “largely uninformed concerning the technical aspects of computerization, and
bound by traditional legal machinery which in many cases may be ineffective against
unconventional criminal operations.” Id.
14 MICHAEL D. SCOTT, § 17.12 Federal Computer Crime Legislation, in SCOTT
ON INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY LAW (2014).
15 Id.
16 Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, §§ 1602(a), 2102(a), 98
Stat. 2183, 2190.
17 See Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), ELECTRONIC PRIVACY
INFORMATION CTR., https://epic.org/privacy/ecpa/ [http://perma.cc/4R8B-TUH2] (last
visited Dec. 6, 2015); Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99508, 100 Stat.1848 (codified as amended in various sections of 18 U.S.C.).
18 For example, in 1994, Congress added private causes of action to the CFAA
to allow victims to recover economic damages in civil cases. See Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2012).
19 United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504, 505 (2d Cir. 1991).
20 Kim Zetter, Judge Acquits Lori Drew in Cyberbullying Case, Overrules
Jury, WIRED (July 2, 2009, 3:04 PM), http://www.wired.com/2009/07/drew_court/
[http://perma.cc/S63V-WMLH].
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One of the murkier activities that may constitute hacking
is data scraping. Unlike traditional hacking, scraping involves
using computer programs, known as scrapers, to extract large
amounts of data from websites.21 Scrapers automatically compile
Internet search results, filter inappropriate content, and extract
large amounts of information from public and private websites.22
Because scrapers are fairly inexpensive and easy to access, they
are used for a variety of purposes, both beneficial and harmful.23
In order to be considered beneficial, scrapers should meet
at least three criteria. First, the scraper should gather data that
is already publicly available and is not protected by a code
barrier, such as a password or other technical security measure.
Second, the scraper should be used to amalgamate data and
present it in a manner that offers some benefit to a consumer in
terms of efficiency or ease-of-access. And third, the scraper should
be used in a way that does not directly harm the data host from
which it retrieves the data, such as by inhibiting the data host’s
own access to its data, compromising the safety of the data host’s
consumers, or seriously undermining the data host’s website
functionality or profitability.
One example of a beneficial type of scraper is a targeted
advertiser. This is a company that aggregates large amounts of
data in order to develop personalized advertising, which identifies
and fills consumer demand.24 A second example is a price
aggregator; this is a company that parses data from a number of
industry-specific websites, such as airline ticket websites, to create
a cohesive comparison for consumers of the various price offerings
on the Internet.25 A third example is a personal finance
management service like Mint.com or inDinero.com, which use
scrapers to aggregate their consumers’ banking information to
allow users to track their spending and finances.26 But scrapers
21 Aaron Rubin & Tiffany Hu, How Website Operators Use CFAA to Combat DataScraping, LAW360 (Aug. 25, 2014, 10:01 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/56
9325?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=articles_search [http://perma.cc/
64WX-HFVY]. Sometimes scrapers are referred to as web site scrapers, content miners,
web site rippers, web extractors, automated data collectors, or HTML scrapers. What is
a Screen Scraper? WISEGEEK, http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-a-screen-scraper.htm
[http://perma.cc/TTV3-XKAL] (last visited Dec. 6, 2015).
22 EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 579 (1st Cir. 2001).
23 See Software for Web Scraping, WEB SCRAPING, http://scraping.pro/
software-for-web-scraping/ [http://perma.cc/4Y3A-7V8Y] (last visited Dec. 6, 2015)
(listing available web data extraction applications).
24 Id.
25 See Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.Com, Inc., No. CV997654HLHVBKX,
2003 WL 21406289, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2003).
26 Mint. It’s All Coming Together, MINT, https://www.mint.com/how-mint-works
[http://perma.cc/934M-2S7J] (last visited Dec. 6, 2015); About inDinero, INDINERO,
https://indinero.com/about-indinero [http://perma.cc/LN76-6SLQ] (last visited Dec. 6,
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can also be used harmfully. Harmful uses of scrapers differ from
beneficial uses in at least two key ways. First, harmful scrapers
amalgamate data that is not intended for public use, such as
confidential information that was protected by a code barrier or
other technological measure.27 Second, in amalgamating
nonpublic data, harmful scrapers directly harm the data host by
diminishing the data host’s website operability or severely
undercutting its profits. If a scraper meets these two conditions,
then the scraper is harmful even if the scraper’s ultimate use
benefits certain consumers. Such scrapers are also likely
aggregating data in a manner that the CFAA would consider
unlawful hacking. To understand how the CFAA conceptualizes
hacking and whether scraping might constitute unlawful hacking,
it is important to differentiate between various types of scrapers
and to determine what, if any, damage they cause.
Whether scraping constitutes hacking is most unclear
when the breached data is not protected by a technical barrier but
is clearly unintended for public use. This was the situation in the
widely publicized case United States v. Auernheimer.28 In
Auernheimer, which arose around the time that Apple first
introduced the iPad, customers who wanted to send and receive
data over cellular networks had to purchase a data contract from
AT&T. Additionally, customers had to register their accounts
with AT&T on a website that AT&T controlled. The customers
were assigned a user identification (their email address) to access
their accounts through AT&T’s website. In order to make it easier
for customers to log in to their accounts, AT&T programmed their
servers to search for customers’ identifiers based on the
customers’ unique URLs. The servers could then prepopulate the
customers’ login screens. Defendants Spitler and Auernheimer
discovered AT&T’s login configuration and wrote a scraper (what
they called an “account slurper”) to automatically access AT&T’s
website through different URLs and save all the different emails
that AT&T generated in the login box. Through their scraper,
Spitler and Auernheimer recorded 114,000 of AT&T’s customers’
email addresses.29 Although technically, the email addresses were
publicly accessible, AT&T designed them to be practically
inaccessible unless an individual visited the correct, publicly
available URL. The case was dismissed on venue grounds, and so
2015); Mary Wisniewski, Is It Time to End Screen Scraping?, AM. BANKER (Nov. 7, 2014),
http://www.americanbanker.com/news/technology/is-it-time-to-end-screen-scraping-107
1118-1.html [http://perma.cc/TH72-L4H9].
27 Ticketmaster Corp., 2003 WL 21406289, at *2.
28 United States v. Auernheimer, 748 F.3d 525, 529-31 (3d Cir. 2014).
29 Id. at 531.
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the question of whether the defendants’ scraper violated the CFAA
remains open.30
This note analyzes the jurisprudence of federal scraping
cases and places scraping within the broader framework of
computer hacking prohibited under the CFAA. In doing so, this
note clarifies when scraping constitutes hacking in violation of
federal criminal law.
Part I provides an overview of data scraping and explains
why it is both beneficial and harmful to society. Part II explains
why the CFAA contains ambiguous language regarding the
critical term “authorization.” Part II explains how this drafting
ambiguity has caused confusion about the application of the
CFAA to scraping (resulting in a circuit split) and undermined
the CFAA’s effectiveness as an antihacking statute. Part III
analyzes the jurisprudence of several CFAA scraping cases. It
argues that those courts adopting a broad definition of the term
authorization in the CFAA are creating further problems for the
statute. A broad definition of authorization fails to distinguish
between those types of data-accessing activities that are forbidden
and those that are permissible. Therefore, it provides inadequate
notice to scraper developers and users of when their conduct is
unlawful. Part III also discusses how courts have applied the
common law legal doctrine of trespass to chattels to scraping and
utilized this doctrine as a tool to combat scrapers that directly
harm competing businesses without breaking technical codes.
In conclusion, this note argues that only those scrapers
that circumvent a technical code to access information that a data
host clearly intended to block from public access should be liable
under the CFAA. Only by limiting the CFAA’s application to
scraping in this manner will courts protect the statute’s integrity
and allow society to continue to reap the benefits of scrapers.
I.

SCRAPING: THE BENEFITS AND THE HARMS

Scraping is the practice of extracting large amounts of
data, usually from publicly available websites, through the use of
scrapers.31 Scrapers are computer programs with the ability to
automatically compile Internet search results, filter for
inappropriate content, and extract large amounts of data from
public or private websites.32 Generally, scrapers search through
all the code in a website and filter out the extraneous data that is
30
31
32

Id. at 540-41.
Rubin & Hu, supra note 21.
EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 579 (1st Cir. 2001).
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merely in place for the website’s aesthetic appeal.33 After
extracting the valuable data, scrapers present it in an easy-to-use
format, such as graphs, tables, and indexes, which can be used for
a variety of purposes.34
Businesses often hire experts to design sophisticated
scrapers.35 Due to the ease of acquiring and using scrapers,
individuals often engage in scraping as well. Individuals can
readily find scraping software through a simple Internet search.36
Scrapers also have broad appeal due to their speed. They “can
retrieve several pages on a server simultaneously” and “access
target websites automatically thousands of times per day.”37
Scrapers can also translate various computer languages, such as
HTML, JavaScript, or PHP.38 Due to these capabilities, it is
unsurprising that businesses and individuals prefer using
scrapers to manually collecting data.
The websites from which scrapers collect data are called
“data hosts.”39 Whether a scraper is beneficial or harmful depends
in part on how much direct damage, if any, it causes to the data
host. Certain scrapers, such as price amalgamators and targeted
advertisers, cause minimal to no damage to data hosts and allow
businesses to efficiently cater to consumer demands. Other
scrapers cause extensive damage to data hosts. For example, if the
data host and scraper user have competing businesses and the
scraper user collects the data host’s valuable data for its own
competitive advantage, it may drive traffic away from the
competitor’s site and directly undercut the data host’s revenue.40
It is important to distinguish between beneficial and
harmful scraping because harmful scraping that damages data
hosts by accessing confidential, technically protected information is
the type of hacking that the CFAA was designed to deter. In order
What is a Screen Scraper?, supra note 21.
Id.
35 See, e.g., EF Cultural Travel, 274 F.3d at 579; Facebook, Inc. v. ConnectU
LLC, 489 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1089 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
36 See Jeffrey Kenneth Hirschey, Symbiotic Relationships: Pragmatic Acceptance
of Data Scraping, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 897, 904 (2014) (“A quick web search offers
numerous options to scrape data: how-to guides about scraping, guidance in writing your
own scraping program, and even options to purchase scraping software.”); see also Rubin &
Hu, supra note 21 (“Though sometimes difficult to combat, scraping is quite easy to perform.
A simple online search will return a large number of scraping programs, both proprietary
and open source, as well as DIY tutorials.”); What is a Screen Scraper?, supra note 21.
37 Marc S. Friedman & William T. Zanowitz, The Invasion of the “Screen
Scrapers”!, 6 E-COMMERCE L. REP., May 2004, at 4.
38 What is a Screen Scraper?, supra note 21.
39 Hirschey, supra note 36, at 897.
40 EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 583 (1st Cir. 2001).
EF Cultural Travel and Explorica were competing businesses in the teenage tour
market. Explorica designed a scraper to glean pricing information from EF’s website.
Explorica alleged that EF’s scraping caused Explorica’s business to suffer loss. Id.
33

34
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to ensure that scraper users receive adequate notice and to
protect beneficial scraping, only harmful scraping should be
unlawful under the CFAA.
A.

Beneficial Scraping

Internet users frequently interact with and benefit from
scrapers. Common scrapers are search engines, business
advertisers, auction compilers, price aggregators, real estate
listing services, financial data aggregators, financial money
management applications, social media sites, and even tools such
as Google’s PageRank.41 Many of these devices scrape data hosts
without causing them serious harm. In fact, operators of data
hosts often do not know that their websites have been scraped42 or
are not troubled by scraping due to the benefits it provides them.43
For instance, price amalgamators—such as airline ticket
compilers— benefit consumers by helping them access more
widespread data, but they also benefit data hosts by increasing
their visibility.44 Similarly, targeted advertisers parse through
customers’ stored content and personal data to cater to their
specific interests.45 Studies indicate that customers appreciate
and rely on such scraping, which in turn helps businesses
generate tremendous revenue.46
One of the best examples of a beneficial scraper is a search
engine. Search engines constantly access thousands of websites
and present data to end users in the form of easily readable
search results.47 Yet they usually pull only small amounts of data,
such as the user’s search terms, in order to link the user to
relevant search results. Further, search engines only compile
publicly available data; they do not break through password
barriers in order to provide users private, protected data. Due to
their universal appeal, search engines are considered “an

41 “Google’s ubiquitous PageRank algorithm is perhaps the largest scraping
system and uses a web crawler called GoogleBot to scrape data from billions of
webpages. This model is predicated upon unfettered access to data, and data hosts
provide little resistance given the overwhelming benefit that they receive.” Hirschey,
supra note 36, at 897-98 (citation omitted).
42 Id. at 898.
43 Id. at 897-98.
44 Id. at 921-22.
45 William Jeremy Robison, Free at What Cost?: Cloud Computing Privacy
Under the Stored Communications Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195, 1220-21 (2010).
46 Id.
47 What is a Screen Scraper?, supra note 21.
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instrumental part of the online ecosystem.”48 Thus, Google’s
scraping activities are rarely found to be unlawful.49
Beneficial scrapers can also promote business efficiency by
helping businesses pull data from various “keyword-related
websites in order to generate graphs, charts, spreadsheets, and
comparative data” in clean formats.50 These displays help end users
make reports and presentations in a fraction of the time that it
would take if users had to extract data manually.51 Additionally,
scrapers can be useful when data is “stored on a system that can
no longer be accessed due to compatibility issues with newer
hardware or software.”52 This is because most scrapers can
capture data that is no longer present on the live website but is
available through a cache.53 Because scraping can benefit
businesses and consumers without harming data hosts, it is often
considered a “blessing.”54 But scraping also has a darker side.
B.

Harmful Scraping

In addition to beneficial scraping, there is a great deal of
clandestine, harmful scraping. Harmful scrapers collect
information that was not intended for public access and extensively
harm data hosts. These scrapers steal and publish personal data
from websites, collect and spam huge numbers of personal email
accounts, and acquire protected, confidential company data in
order to create competing websites. Data hosts usually suffer from
“increased bandwidth usage, network crashes, the need to employ
anti-spam and filtering technology, user complaints, reputational
damage,” and costs associated with mitigating the damage—all of
which negatively impact the data host.55
Harmful scrapers also often collect information without
the consent of data hosts. In many cases, the scrapers republish
the scraped data on a different website, which in turn decreases
consumer traffic on the original website and undercuts the data
Hirschey, supra note 36, at 898.
See, e.g., Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006) (granting
summary judgment for Google where a data host sued Google, alleging that GoogleBots had
unlawfully provided access to the data host’s web content through Google’s search engine
results); see also In re Google Android Consumer Privacy Litig., No. 11-MD-02264 JSW,
2013 WL 1283236 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2013) (granting Google’s motions to dismiss under the
CFAA and trespass to chattels where Google’s aggregate collection of geolocation data from
cell phone applications did not significantly harm the functioning of the cell phone systems).
50 What is a Screen Scraper?, supra note 21.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.; What is a Browser Cache?, PC TOOLS, http://www.pctools.com/securitynews/what-is-a-browser-cache/ [http://perma.cc/4CDM-SMEN] (last visited Dec. 6, 2015).
54 What is a Screen Scraper?, supra note 21.
55 Rubin & Hu, supra note 21.
48

49
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host’s revenue.56 Additionally, in these instances, the owners of
data hosts may not know until later that content from their
original website was used elsewhere and may feel that their
original work was distorted, compromising their reputations.57
Such scraping can also implicate free speech and copyright
issues.58 Finally, harmful scrapers might also collect personally
identifiable information, which implicates privacy issues59 and
often upsets the data hosts’ membership base.60
Another example of a harmful scraper is one designed to
automatically con people out of money. These types of scrapers
were the subject of a recent case in which the Federal Trade
Commission charged operators of Jerk.com for scraping
personal information from Facebook to create profiles that
labeled people as “jerk” or “not a jerk.”61 The operators of
Jerk.com then falsely told more than 73 million consumers,
including children, that they could revise their online profiles
by paying $30.62 Another example is from United States v.
TomorrowNow Inc., where a scraper extracted confidential
support materials from Oracle’s restricted-access Customer
Connection website in order to sway customers of Oracle’s

56 “[S]ites that depend on advertising to generate revenue have problems
when their ads are being discarded by the screen scraper.” What is a Screen Scraper?,
supra note 21; see also eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1061-62
(N.D. Cal. 2000). Bidder’s Edge was a scraper that scraped eBay’s auction listings and
even copied the auction format on its own website without incurring any of the
investment or operating costs that eBay incurs. Then eBay claimed that Bidder’s Edge
caused it to suffer damages from: “(1) lost capacity of [eBay’s] computer systems . . . ;
(2) damage to eBay’s reputation and goodwill caused by BE’s misleading postings; (3)
dilution of the eBay mark; and (4) BE’s unjust enrichment.” Id. at 1064.
57 See, e.g., Bidder’s Edge, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1063.
58 See What is a Screen Scraper?, supra note 21 (“Copyright issues become
blurry when a screen scraper extracts someone’s hard work and presents it in another
format for another website . . . .”); George H. Fibbe, Screen-Scraping and Harmful
Cybertrespass after Intel, 55 MERCER L. REV. 1011, 1012 (2004).
59 Hirschey, supra note 36, at 899; see, e.g., In re Google Android Consumer
Privacy Litig., No. 11-MD-02264 JSW, 2013 WL 1283236, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26,
2013). Plaintiffs filed suit alleging “that the Google Defendants used code hidden in
Apps . . . to collect personally identifiable information [ ] , including Plaintiffs’ name,
gender, zip code, App activity (including search terms or selections), geolocation data,
and their phones’ universally unique device identifiers . . . without providing proper
notice” or obtaining consent. Id. (internal citation omitted).
60 In March 2014, LinkedIn filed an amended complaint against Robocog for
the alleged harm it caused when it scraped LinkedIn and copied the profiles of various
LinkedIn members without their permission. See Parties’ Joint Case Management
Statement at 1, LinkedIn Corp. v. Robocog Inc., No. C14-00068 (N.D. Cal. May 1,
2014), ECF No. 22, 2014 WL 2444973.
61 FTC Charges Operators of “Jerk.com” Website with Deceiving Consumers, FED.
TRADE COMMISSION (Apr. 7, 2014), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/04/
ftc-charges-operators-jerkcom-website-deceiving-consumers [http://perma.cc/C9GL-4GSF].
62 Id.

2015]

BREACHING AND ENTERING

415

PeopleSoft products away from Oracle.63 When scrapers are
intentionally used to defraud and harm data hosts, consumers,
and general Internet users, criminal liability is appropriate.
C.

Scraping Litigation

In recent years, the number of lawsuits involving
scrapers has increased. A primary reason for this increase is
that many websites are ill equipped to combat harmful
scraping. Since websites are usually designed to be easy to use,
their format benefits scrapers. Additionally, the diversity of
available scrapers makes it difficult for data hosts to fully
anticipate and prevent data scraping.64 Even when websites are
formatted in code that might be “gibberish” to an uninformed
reader, they are still susceptible to sophisticated scrapers.65
In 2013, web scraping accounted for over 10% of site
visitors and more than 20% of all Internet traffic.66 Such
figures indicate that scraping litigation related to hacking will
continue to increase. Since scraping did not exist when the
CFAA was first enacted, and because scraper users have been
sued under the CFAA, it is important to understand the history
and provisions of the CFAA in order to understand when
scraping should be a crime under the act.
II.

THE CFAA: A POTENT ANTIHACKING STATUTE

A.

Historical Context of the CFAA

Congress enacted the first version of the CFAA in 1986
at a time when personal computers were only beginning to
populate the workplace as stores for valuable information.67 At
the time, the media depiction of computer culture, such as the
1983 film War Games,68 led to Congress’s conception of a hacker
63 SAP to Pay $20 Million Criminal Fine in “Web Scraping” Case, 24
WESTLAW J. SOFTWARE L., No. 12 , 2011, at 6.
64 Hirschey, supra note 36, at 904.
65 EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 583 (1st Cir. 2001).
66 Rubin & Hu, supra note 21.
67 Glenn R. Schieck, Undercutting Employee Mobility: The Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act in the Trade Secret Context, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 831, 831-32 (2014) (citing
Greggory S. Blundell, Personal Computers in the Eighties, BYTE (Jan. 1983),
http://archive.org/stream/byte-magazine-1983-01/1983_01_BYTE_08-01_Looking_Ahead#
page/n175/mode/2up [http://perma.cc/ZV2Y-KEQS] (During “the late 1970’s and early
1980’s . . . [n]ew managers entering the business community brought with them a keen
awareness of computer systems gained from both college study and home use.”)).
68 Laura Bernescu, When Is a Hack Not a Hack: Addressing the CFAA’s
Applicability to the Internet Service Context, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 633, 637 (2013);
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as “‘a bright, intellectually curious, and rebellious youth,’ who
could ‘become the white-collar crime superstar of tomorrow.’”69
Because the CFAA drafters did not know how the digital
landscape would develop when they drafted the statute, the
CFAA was amended numerous times between 1990 and 2001.
Its widest expansion was in 1994, when Congress established a
private right of action for individuals harmed by certain
violations of the CFAA.70 This allows a private party “‘who
suffers damage or loss by reason or violation of [the statute]’ to
bring a civil action ‘to obtain compensatory damages and
injunctive relief or other equitable relief.’”71 Thus, it exposes a
violator of the CFAA to civil and criminal liability.
In order to be exposed to civil liability, a violator’s action
must meet at least one of six additional factors listed in the
statute.72 These include: “loss . . . aggregating to at least $5,000 in
value,”73 “the modification or impairment, or potential modification
or impairment, of the medical examination, diagnosis, treatment,
or care of 1 or more individuals,”74 “physical injury to any
person,”75 “a threat to public health or safety,”76 “damage affecting
a computer used by or for . . . the United States Government in
furtherance of the administration of justice, national defense, or
national security,”77 or “damage affecting 10 or more protected
computers during any 1-year period.”78

Joseph M. Olivenbaum, <Ctrl>-<Alt>-<Delete>: Rethinking Federal Computer Crime
Legislation, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 574, 582 (1997).
69 Schieck, supra note 67, at 831.
70 Computer Abuse Amendments Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat.
1796, 2098.
71 WEC Carolina Energy Sols. LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 201 (4th Cir.
2012), cert. dismissed, 133 S. Ct. 831 (2013) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g)).
72 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(I)-(VI) (2012).
73 Id. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(I). Notably, the $5,000 loss provision itself is not too
difficult to reach, because § 1030(e)(11) defines the loss provision such that it includes
efforts by a company to fix the damage.
[T]he term ‘loss’ means any reasonable cost to any victim, including the cost
of responding to an offense, conducting a damage assessment, and restoring
the data, program, system, or information to its condition prior to the offense,
and any revenue lost, cost incurred, or other consequential damages incurred
because of interruption of service.
Id. § 1030(e)(11).
74 Id. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(II).
75 Id. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(III).
76 Id. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(IV).
77 Id. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(V).
78 Id. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(VI).
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Relevant Statutory Provisions

Many computer hacking crimes brought under the
CFAA arise under sections 1030(a)(2) and 1030(a)(4). Section
1030(a)(2), which is the broadest provision of the statute,
makes it a crime when a person
intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds
authorized access, and thereby obtains—(A) information contained in a
financial record of a financial institution . . . (B) information from any
department or agency of the United States; or (C) information from any
protected computer.79

Section 1030(a)(4) has a narrower focus on fraudulent activity
and makes it a crime when a person
knowingly and with intent to defraud, accesses a protected computer
without authorization, or exceeds authorized access, and by means of
such conduct furthers the intended fraud and obtains anything of
value, unless the object of the fraud and the thing obtained consists
only of the use of the computer and the value of such use is not more
than $5,000 in any 1-year period.80

While the language of section1030(a)(4) is similar to that
of 1030(a)(2), section 1030(a)(4) has the added requirement that
the offender have the specific intent to defraud and further the
intended fraud by causing a loss of value of at least $5,000
through his/her use.81 Data-breaching crimes also arise under
section 1030(a)(5), which penalizes one who:
(A) knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information,
code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally
causes damage without authorization, to a protected computer; (B)
intentionally accesses a protected computer without authorization,
and as a result of such conduct, recklessly causes damage; or (C)
intentionally accesses a protected computer without authorization,
and as a result of such conduct, causes damage and loss.82

Finally, section 1030(g) covers the civil liability expansion
when the offender’s actions also meet one of the six elements
set out in sections 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(I)-(V).83

79
80
81
82
83

Id. § 1030(a)(2)(A)-(C).
Id. § 1030(a)(4).
Id.
Id. § 1030(a)(5)(A)-(C).
Id. § 1030(g), (c)(4)(A)(i)(I)-(V).
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Sections 1030(a)(2), 1030(a)(4), and 1030(a)(5) all include
either the phrase: “without authorization” or “exceeds authorized
access.” The phrase “exceeds authorized access” is defined in the
statute as: “to access a computer with authorization and to use
such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that
the accesser is not entitled to so obtain or alter.” Although this
definition establishes that unauthorized computer access
constitutes hacking, problematically, the word “authorized” is
never defined. Consequently, circuits have interpreted the term
“authorization” differently depending on the context of the case;
as a result, the statute has not been consistently interpreted.84
It is important to understand the circuit split regarding
the meaning of authorization because the statute carries serious
penalties.85 The split is particularly relevant in scraping cases
because the factors that motivated certain circuits to adopt a
broad view of what constitutes authorization are not implicated in
scraping cases. These broad definitions of authorization were
formed in the context of cases involving unfair competition, trade
secret misappropriation, threats to individuals’ privacy and
security, and other legal wrongs—crimes that are inherently
different from scraping.
Additionally, allowing courts to apply a broad definition of
authorization fails to provide users of scrapers with adequate
notice of when they are violating criminal law. Because there are
many beneficial scrapers that do not harm data hosts or
consumers, adopting a broad view of authorization would cast too
much uncertainty on whether scraping is authorized and would
84 Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization”
in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596, 1596 (2003); see, e.g., United
States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 864 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (holding that the phrase
“exceeds authorized access” is limited to access restrictions, not use restrictions). But
see Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121,
1125, 1129 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (holding that Shurgard lost authorization and breached
the CFAA when he became an agent of a direct competitor and used his employer’s
proprietary information in a way that damaged his employer).
85

(1)(A) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than ten years, or
both, in the case of an offense under subsection (a)(1) of this section which
does not occur after a conviction for another offense under this section, or an
attempt to commit an offense punishable under this subparagraph; and
(B) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or
both, in the case of an offense under subsection (a)(1) of this section which
occurs after a conviction for another offense under this section, or an attempt
to commit an offense punishable under this subparagraph . . . .
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c) (2012).
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thereby deter beneficial scraping. Thus, in order to ensure that
only those engaged in harmful scraping are punished, the scope of
authorization must be based on the narrow view that only
technical breaches violate the CFAA.86
1. Narrow View of Authorization
The Fourth and Ninth Circuits have adopted a narrow
definition of authorization.87 In the seminal case United States v.
Nosal, employees of an executive search firm used their access to
the employer’s database to obtain and pass along confidential
company information to a former employee whom they knew was
trying to set up a competing business. The Ninth Circuit held that
because the current employees had logged into the firm database
with their valid credentials, they had proper authorization and
had not violated the CFAA, even though their ultimate use of the
information was inconsistent with the purpose for which they had
been granted access. In determining that the phrase “exceeds
authorized access” did not extend to violations of use restrictions,88
the opinion referred to the original Senate Reports that discussed
how computer hacking was akin to intentional trespass.89
The court did not foreclose the possibility that hackers
could be inside employees. Rather, it interpreted the phrase
“without authorization” as designed to apply to outside hackers
who have no authorized access to a computer and the phrase
“exceeds authorized access” to apply to inside hackers “whose
initial access to a computer is authorized but who access
unauthorized information or files.”90 Thus, the court’s focus was
on the technical means by which data was obtained. Insiders
would be hackers only if they obtained data to which they did
not have precise access, even if they had access to the broader
network where such data was stored.

A technical breach is one that violates a code barrier, such as a password.
Nosal, 676 F.3d at 864 (holding that the phrase “exceeds authorized
access” is limited to access restrictions, not use restrictions); WEC Carolina Energy
Sols. LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 206 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. dismissed, 133 S. Ct. 831
(2013); LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1137 (9th Cir. 2009).
88 “Therefore, we hold that ‘exceeds authorized access’ in the CFAA is limited
to violations of restrictions on access to information, and not restrictions on its use.”
Nosal, 676 F.3d at 863-64.
89 “[I]ntentionally trespassing into someone else’s computer files, the offender
obtains at the very least information as to how to break into that computer system.” Id.
at 858 (citing S. REP. No. 99-432, at 9 (1986) (Conf. Rep.)).
90 Nosal, 676 F.3d at 858.
86

87
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The court found that only a narrow interpretation of
authorization comported with the plain meaning of the statute.91
It stated that any other meaning would turn a serious federal
criminal hacking statute into a “sweeping Internet-policing
mandate”92 and would displace a substantial portion of the
common law.93 The court was also concerned with the rule of
lenity.94 This rule of statutory interpretation states that in
construing a criminal statute that contains an ambiguity, after
“seizing everything from which aid can be derived,” courts ought
to resolve the ambiguity in favor of the defendant so that they do
not “penalize those whose conduct does not create the risks of
harm at which the statute aims.”95 Using the rule of lenity, the
court in Nosal found that unless it interpreted authorization
narrowly, it would “make criminals of large groups of people who
would have little reason to suspect they are committing a federal
crime.”96 The same concerns with notice and lenity apply to
scraper users, particularly when the scrapers are beneficial and
the users’ conduct is not what the statute aims to deter.

91 “This is a perfectly plausible construction of the statutory language that
maintains the CFAA’s focus on hacking rather than turning it into a sweeping
Internet-policing mandate.” Nosal, 676 F.3d at 858. The court arrived at a similar
holding three years earlier in LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, which also involved a
rogue employee who misappropriated company information for his own purposes.
Again the court found that under the plain meaning of the statute, Brekka did not
violate the CFAA, as he had access to the information and was therefore not “without
authorization.” LVRC Holdings, 581 F.3d at 1137.
92 Nosal, 676 F.3d at 858.
93 “Under the presumption that Congress acts interstitially, we construe a
statute as displacing a substantial portion of the common law only where Congress has
clearly indicated its intent to do so.” Id. at 857.
94

If Congress wants to incorporate misappropriation liability into the CFAA, it
must speak more clearly. The rule of lenity requires penal laws . . . to be
construed strictly. [W]hen choice has to be made between two readings of
what conduct Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose
the harsher alternative, to require that Congress should have spoken in
language that is clear and definite.
Id. at 863 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
95 Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138-39 (1998).
96

While it’s unlikely that you’ll be prosecuted for watching Reason.TV on your
work computer, you could be. Employers wanting to rid themselves of
troublesome employees without following proper procedures could threaten to
report them to the FBI unless they quit. Ubiquitous, seldom-prosecuted
crimes invite arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
Id. at 859-60 (footnote omitted).
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2. Broad View of Authorization
In contrast to the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, the First,
Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits have adopted broad definitions of
authorization.97 This is largely because the addition of the CFAA’s
civil liability provision has encouraged employers to increasingly
use section 1030(g) to bring disloyal employees into federal court.
Further, now that companies store the bulk of their information
digitally, rather than in filing cabinets and safes, employers use
the civil liability provisions to sue employees who access and
misuse such information. The First, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits
have creatively adapted agency, duty of loyalty, and contract
theories, and created use-based theories, in order to find CFAA
liability in such instances.
a. Duty of Loyalty/Agency Theory
The duty of loyalty theory provides that authorization
implicitly ends as soon as an employee becomes disloyal to his/her
employer, even if he or she still has technical authorization. Thus,
in Shurgard Storage Centers, Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc.,
a district court in the Western District of Washington held that
Shurgard lost authorization and breached the CFAA when he
became an agent of a direct competitor and used his employer’s
proprietary information in a way that was adverse to his
employer’s interests.98 Similarly, in International Airport Centers
v. Citrin, the court held that an employee exceeded authorized
access and therefore violated the CFAA when, after deciding to go
into business for himself, he erased certain programs belonging to
his former employer to which he still had access.99
b. Contract Theory
The contract-based understanding of authorization
provides that if an individual acquires or utilizes information
in breach of a written policy, such as a confidentiality
agreement, workplace rules of conduct, or a terms-of-service
97 See, e.g., United States v. Czubinski, 106 F.3d 1069, 1078-79 (1st Cir.
1997); United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 271 (5th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1261-63 (11th Cir. 2010).
98 Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp.
2d 1121, 1125, 1129 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
99 Once the employee breached his duty of loyalty to the company, he
terminated the agency relationship and “with it his authority to access the laptop,
because the only basis of his authority had been that relationship.” Int’l Airport Ctrs.,
L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420-21 (7th Cir. 2006).
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agreement, then even technically authorized use constitutes
unauthorized use under the CFAA.100 In EF Cultural Travel BV
v. Explorica, Inc., a case in which the teenage tour company EF
Cultural Travel sued its competitor, Explorica, the First Circuit
held that Explorica violated the CFAA when it used a scraper
to glean information from EF Cultural Travel.101 In that case,
the vice president of Explorica directed his company to hire an
expert to design a scraper that would automatically glean EF
Cultural Travel’s pricing information from its website.102
Because the vice president of Explorica previously worked at
EF Cultural travel and had signed a confidentiality agreement
with Explorica, the court reasoned that Explorica’s use of the
scraper breached this confidentiality agreement, and as such,
exceeded authorization under the CFAA.103
c. “Intended Use” Theory
The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have both employed what
they call an “intended use” theory. Under this theory, courts look
at the underlying purpose of certain company policies to
determine whether an employee breached or exceeded technically
authorized access. The analysis is similar to the contract theory,
but can be broader, as it considers how employees used the
information they obtained even if those employees did not directly
breach a written policy or contract.
One example of a case where this theory was adopted is
United States v. John.104 There, the Fifth Circuit held that an
employee violated the CFAA when she used data from Citigroup’s
internal computer system to obtain customer account information,
which she then shared with a third party in order to engage in

100

The owner can condition use of the computer on a user’s agreement to comply
with certain rules. If the user has a preexisting relationship with the
owner/operator, the conditions may take the form of Terms of Service. If no
such relationship exists, the conditions may appear as Terms of Use to the
service the computer provides, such as a click-through agreement that might
appear prior to use of a website. For example, an adult website may require a
user to promise that she is at least eighteen years old before allowing her to
access adult materials available through the website. Finally, the restriction
may be implicit rather than stated in the written text.
Kerr, supra note 84, at 1645-46.
101 EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 578 (1st Cir. 2001).
102 Id. at 579-84.
103 Id.
104 United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 269 (5th Cir. 2010).
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fraudulent activity.105 The court stated that such use was not
what the company intended when it granted her access.106
Similarly, in United States v. Rodriguez, the Eleventh Circuit
held that an employee of the United States Social Security
Administration violated the CFAA when, in violation of the
agency’s broad policy against obtaining information for
nonbusiness purposes, he obtained confidential personal
information from the agency’s computers that included: the social
security numbers, birthdates, income, and home addresses of his
ex-wife, ex-girlfriend, coworkers, and other acquaintances.107
The duty of loyalty, contract, and intended use theories
have certain differences; however, they each represent an
example of how circuits have supported a broad interpretation
of authorization under the CFAA in order to include breaches
of data that were not technical. Predictably, there are problems
with circuits employing different theories to interpret the term
authorization in the context of scraping, especially since the
CFAA contains civil and criminal provisions, which create
concerns about notice and deterrence.
3. General Problems With the Interpretation of
Authorization and Why the Narrow Approach Must
Apply to Scraping Cases
The circuit split over critical language in the CFAA is
problematic for both the judiciary and the citizenry. Professor
Orin Kerr attributes the circuits’ varying interpretations of
authorization under the CFAA to the courts’ focus on “resultsoriented outcomes.”108 He believes that “[w]hen computer misuse
caused harm to a victim in some way,” courts tended to conclude
that the victims were deprived of some property right and would
find reasons to hold the defendants liable.109 But “[w]hen no
appreciable harm resulted, courts tended to . . . hold that the
defendants committed no crime.”110 He argues that although
many of those decisions have “rough appeal,” when analyzed on a
case-by-case basis, invoking various common law theories derails
105 Id. at 272. “John accessed account information for individuals whose
accounts she did not manage, removed this highly sensitive and confidential
information from Citigroup premises, and ultimately used this information to
perpetrate fraud on Citigroup and its customers.” Id.
106 Id. at 271 (stating that John’s use of Citigroup’s computer system to perpetrate
a fraud was also contrary to Citigroup’s employee policies, of which she was aware).
107 United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1260-62 (11th Cir. 2010).
108 Kerr, supra note 84, at 1611.
109 Id.
110 Id.
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the integrity of the CFAA as an antihacking statute that is based
on theories of criminal theft, fraud, and trespass. Professor Kerr’s
characterization of the circuits’ results-oriented outcomes helps
explain their varying approaches. And often, when the cases are
analyzed individually, their results appear reasonable. But the
circuit split ultimately prevents the judiciary from establishing a
cohesive jurisprudence regarding the concept of authorization
under the CFAA. The problems with this statutory incoherence
will only amplify as hacking becomes more sophisticated.
Inconsistent interpretations of key language in the CFAA
are highly problematic because they can induce noncompliance
with congressional intent, displace the common law, abuse federal
jurisdiction, and violate the rule of lenity. Of these, the biggest
problem is insufficient notice, because potential offenders ought to
know when their seemingly harmless conduct may subject them
to serious criminal penalties. Further, because the rule of lenity
mandates that when a statute is ambiguous, courts should resolve
the ambiguity in favor of the defendant, courts should cure the
ambiguity in the statute now so that they will not have to resort
to this rule when public safety concerns and the need to deter
dangerous cybercriminals arise.
The Fourth Circuit discussed at length how the rule of
lenity was implicated in WEC Carolina Energy Solutions.111 In
that case, a former employee of WEC made a presentation to a
potential customer, incorporating proprietary information that
he had gained from his former employer before leaving.112 The
Fourth Circuit held that he did not violate the CFAA.113 The
court stated that in the interest of providing “fair warning” to
potential offenders, one had to “construe this criminal statute
strictly and avoid interpretations not ‘clearly warranted by the
text.’”114 The court also stressed that individuals must know
“what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed.”115 This is
critical when the line is paper thin, as it is in the CFAA.
Similarly, in Nosal, the Ninth Circuit Chief Judge
Kozinski recognized that employees frequently procrastinate,
unaware that their seemingly innocuous conduct breaches federal
computer crime laws. He stated, “Minds have wandered since the
beginning of time and the computer gives employees new ways to
111 WEC Carolina Energy Sols. LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 204 (4th Cir.
2012), cert. dismissed, 133 S. Ct. 831 (2013).
112 Id. at 202.
113 Id. at 204.
114 Id. (citing Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 160 (1990)).
115 WEC Carolina Energy Sols., 687 F.3d at 204 (citing Babbitt v. Sweet Home
Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 704 n.18 (1995)).
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procrastinate, by g-chatting with friends, playing games,
shopping or watching sports highlights.”116 He emphasized that
even if employees are seldom disciplined for such frivoling, under
the broad interpretation of the CFAA, whenever a company has a
policy against such actions, harmless dalliances could become
federal crimes, and thus, “[e]mployers wanting to rid themselves
of troublesome employees . . . could threaten to report them to the
FBI unless they quit.”117 He warned that “[u]biquitous, seldomprosecuted crimes invite arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement.”118 Indeed, enabling employers to get rid of delinquent
employees with the threat of criminal sanctions contravenes the
express purpose of the CFAA. It also defies the spirit of American
criminal jurisprudence, which admonishes arbitrary and
discriminatory law enforcement, especially when employees are
unaware of their violations.
The Ninth Circuit reasonably recognized that in modern
times, employees use computers for a number of purposes that,
while not conducive to their jobs, do not directly harm
employers. Because the Ninth Circuit wanted to ensure that
procrastinating employees are not needlessly swept under the
ambit of a powerful criminal statute, it interpreted
authorization narrowly, requiring that there be a code breach
before employees could be liable for violating the CFAA. The
same reasoning must apply to scraping so that those operating
scrapers know when their actions violate the CFAA.
The need for adequate notice is arguably more pressing
in the scraping context than in the employment context. Most
employment cases that arise under the CFAA involve a current
or former employee who misappropriated trade secrets or
violated a confidentiality agreement, both of which are still
unlawful actions. But many beneficial scrapers have not
violated any law. Thus, when CFAA suits are brought against
116
117
118

United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 860 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
Id.
Id. As Chief Judge Kozinski further noted,

Suppose an employee spends six hours tending his FarmVille stable on his
work computer. The employee has full access to his computer and the
Internet, but the company has a policy that work computers may be used
only for business purposes. The employer should be able to fire the employee,
but that’s quite different from having him arrested as a federal criminal. Yet
under the government’s construction of the statute, the employee “exceeds
authorized access” by using the computer for non-work activities. Given that
the employee deprives his company of six hours of work a day, an aggressive
prosecutor might claim that he’s defrauding the company, and thereby
violating section 1030(a)(4).
Id. at 860 n.7.
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such scrapers, the CFAA is not being used in place of another
charge; rather, it is being used to condemn Internet activity
that is perfectly permissible.
In cases with harmful scrapers where the user did not
breach a code but still seriously damaged a data host, there may
be an adequate remedy in the common law doctrine of trespass
to chattels. Because different remedies are available under
various laws, it is important to understand why courts
increasingly require a code or technical breach for scraping to
violate CFAA. Additionally, it is crucial to understand that a
code-based requirement will not leave data hosts that do not
erect code barriers without legal recourse, as many harmful
scraper users can still be liable under the common law doctrine
of trespass to chattels. Thus, it is important to see how trespass
to chattels can provide data hosts with remedies in some
scraping cases.
III.

SCRAPING, THE CFAA, AND TRESPASS TO CHATTELS

A.

Scraping and the CFAA: The Journey Towards a Code
Requirement

In recent CFAA litigation, courts have shifted their
focus from contractual theories of liability to technical theories
of liability. More courts now embrace a code-based requirement
to find scrapers liable under the CFAA. This is partly due to
the realization that a code-based requirement effectively deters
the use of harmful scrapers, which Congress likely intended to
proscribe, and it protects users of beneficial scrapers who do
not know that they could be violating criminal law.
1. Early Days: No Code Requirement
A good place to begin an analysis of scraping claims
brought under the CFAA is by looking at the 2001 case EF
Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc.119 There, employees who
initially worked for EF Cultural Travel when it was one of the
world’s largest teenage tour organizations went to work for
Explorica when it later entered the teenage tour market.120 To try
and gain a competitive advantage over EF Cultural Travel, the
vice president of Explorica (a former EF Cultural Travel
employee) hired an Internet consultant to design a scraper that
119
120

EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 2001).
Id. at 579.
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could glean pricing information from EF Cultural Travel’s
website.121 Explorica then used the scraped information to
undercut EF Cultural Travel’s prices.122 The district court and the
First Circuit approved an injunction against Explorica.123 Yet
neither court was concerned with how the scraper technically
operated.124 Although the scraper was custom designed by a
technical expert who relied on unique knowledge from a former
EF Cultural Travel employee, was able to decode EF Cultural
Travel’s website’s information that the public could not interpret,
and systematically undercut EF Cultural Travel, the First Circuit
found Explorica liable because, in designing the scraper, the
former employee breached a confidentiality agreement that he had
previously signed with EF Cultural Travel.125 The court stated,
“because of the broad confidentiality agreement appellants’ actions
‘exceed[ed] authorized access,’ and so we do not reach the more
general arguments made about statutory meaning, including
whether use of a scraper alone renders access unauthorized.”126
In EF v. Explorica, the court avoided discussing how
scraping related to authorization and instead focused on the
clear contract violation.127 When the auxiliary case, EF Cultural
Travel BV v. Zefer,128 came up two years later, however, the
problems with relying on a contract-based definition of
authorization became apparent. Arising from the same set of
events as EF v. Explorica, in EF v. Zefer, the defendant (Zefer)
was the independent company that made the scraper that
Explorica used to scrape EF Cultural Travel.129 But because
Zefer was not subject to any confidentiality agreement with
Explorica, the court could not find an independent basis for
Zefer’s liability and narrowly upheld EF Cultural Travel’s
injunction against Zefer on the ground that Zefer was EF
Cultural Travel’s software maker.130
EF v. Zefer nicely illustrates the danger of reliance on a
contract theory for liability because in any situation where a
user or designer of a scraper is not bound by a direct contract
with the data host, a court may not be able to find CFAA
liability based on the motive with which the scraper is used.
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130

Id.
Id. at 580.
Id. at 578-79.
Id. at 581-82.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 582.
EF Cultural Travel BV v. Zefer Corp., 318 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2003).
Id. at 58.
Id. at 64.
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But the CFAA is a criminal statute that requires assessing a
violator’s mens rea. Thus, a criminal liability theory that
circumvents the questions of how and why a scraper was used
does not accord with criminal liability jurisprudence that
requires specific intent.
2. Movement Towards a Code Requirement
Two similar cases, both involving Facebook, illustrate
why, over time, courts required more than a contractual breach
for scraping liability. In 2007, Facebook brought a claim against
ConnectU LLC, alleging that ConnectU violated the CFAA by
designing a scraper that collected millions of email addresses that
were available to registered users of Facebook but not to the
general public.131 Facebook argued that the scraper violated
Facebook’s terms and conditions of use, which specifically
prohibited users from collecting, copying, and using data found on
its site without Facebook’s permission.132 ConnectU argued that
since registered users voluntarily supplied their information to
Facebook, its scraper had authorization to collect that
information.133 It also argued that it would be dangerous to allow a
criminal standard to depend on terms that private parties set at
their discretion.134 The court, unpersuaded by both of ConnectU’s
arguments, found ConnectU liable under the CFAA.135 It stated
that the statute defines criminal offenses and that private parties
only set the conditions upon which they grant authorization.136
The second Facebook case, Facebook, Inc. v. Power
Ventures, Inc., arose three years later in the same
jurisdiction.137 In that case, Facebook alleged that Power
Ventures violated California Penal Code section 502,
California’s analogue to the CFAA, when Power Ventures used
a scraper to access Facebook’s website in violation of
Facebook’s Terms of Service.138 This time, however, Facebook
also alleged that the scraper violated several “cease and desist”
Facebook, Inc. v. ConnectU LLC, 489 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1089 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
Id. at 1091.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., No. C 08-05780 JW, 2010 WL
3291750 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2010).
138 Id. at *7. Facebook’s terms of use state: “[A Facebook user may] not collect
users’ content or information, or otherwise access Facebook, using automated means (such
as harvesting bots, robots, spiders, or scrapers) without [Facebook’s] prior permission.”
Terms of Service, FACEBOOK (Jan. 30, 2015), https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms
[http://perma.cc/HPC3-84XT].
131

132
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orders139 and bypassed special technical barriers.140 The court,
relying on case law interpreting the CFAA, held that the
scraper “did not act ‘without permission’ within the meaning of
section 502.”141 Unlike its reasoning three years earlier in
Facebook, Inc. v. ConnectU LLC, this time, the court discussed
how imposing criminal liability on the basis of terms of use or a
cease and desist letter would grant the data host the ability to
define the scope of federal criminality, which it found
“constitutionally untenable.”142
In Power Ventures, the court was concerned with exactly
what ConnectU had previously warned about—that a contractbased concept of authorization would effectively allow private
parties to determine the scope of criminal liability. The court
did note that to the extent that Facebook could prove that
Power Ventures circumvented technical barriers, it could be
liable for violating the statute.143 In doing so, the court
recognized that a key consideration for finding that a scraper’s
use exceeded authorization would be whether the scraper
overcame a technical barrier.
Although Facebook lacked proof of a technical breach in
both cases, in the second case, the court discussed the
importance of a technical standard at length. It stated how
access that violates a code barrier crosses a clear demarcation
that the administrator has erected “to restrict the user’s
privileges within the system, or to bar the user from the system
altogether.”144 The court further explained that when “a user
gains access to a computer, computer network, or website” by
overcoming technical barriers, the user has “eliminate[d] any
constitutional notice concerns, since a person applying the
technical skill necessary to overcome such a barrier will almost
always understand that any access gained through such action
139
140
141

Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, 2010 WL 3291750, at *10-11.
Id. at *5.
Id. at *12.

142

By granting the computer owner essentially unlimited authority to define
authorization, the contract standard delegates the scope of criminality to
every computer owner. Users of computer and internet services cannot have
adequate notice of what actions will or will not expose them to criminal
liability when a computer network or website administrator can unilaterally
change the rules at any time and are under no obligation to make terms of
use specific or understandable to the general public.
Id. (citing Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization”
in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596, 1650-51 (2003)).
143 Id. at *12.
144 Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., No. C 08-05780 JW, 2010 WL 3291750,
at *11 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2010).
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is unauthorized.”145 The court correctly reasoned that such an
instance is appropriate for criminal liability because if a
scraper user utilized special knowledge to bypass a code
barrier, it implies that the user intended to access an
unauthorized source of information. Consequently, the court
stated, “accessing or using a computer, computer network, or
website in a manner that overcomes technical or code-based
barriers is ‘without permission,’ and may subject a user to
liability.”146
These cases show why a technical breach requirement
for CFAA liability would resolve important notice concerns.
The requirement would ensure that regardless of the wording
of data hosts’ individual terms of service agreements and cease
and desist letters, data hosts would at most only shape
contractual liability. Criminal liability under the CFAA would
only arise when a scraper user breaches a technical barrier
with the knowledge that the user did not have authorization.
3. Emergence of a Code-Based Requirement
Two fairly recent scraping cases illustrate the trend of
courts requiring a code-based breach to establish CFAA liability.
The first is a 2010 case entitled Cvent, Inc. v. Eventbrite, Inc.147 In
that case, Cvent, an event-planning company, alleged that
Eventbrite designed and used a scraper to collect information
from Cvent’s website, reformat it, and post it as its own.148 Cvent
asserted that the scraping deprived it of its monetary investment
in the website and led to lost profits.149 Eventbrite responded that
because Cvent’s website was publicly available on the Internet
and did not require any login, password, or individualized grant of
access, by definition, Eventbrite could not have exceeded its
authority to access Cvent’s data.150 While Cvent did have a terms of
use agreement that prohibited competitors from accessing
information on its site,151 the court sided with Eventbrite and
condemned Cvent for not taking affirmative steps to block
competitors from accessing its data.152 The court stated that unless
Cvent took meaningful protective steps, anyone, including direct

145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152

Id.
Id.
Cvent, Inc. v. Eventbrite, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 2d 927 (E.D. Va. 2010).
Id. at 930.
Id. at 930-31.
Id. at 932.
Id.
Id. at 932-33.
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business competitors, could search and access Cvent’s information
at will.153
The second case that underscores the courts’ movement
towards a code-based rule is the 2013 case Fidlar Technologies v.
LPS.154 There, a technology company (Fidlar) partnered with a
number of governmental entities and sold them a software
program called Laredo, which those agencies used to let
community members view county records—the idea being that if
after previewing the county records, individuals wanted to
obtain the records, they would have to purchase them from their
local county offices.155 As such, Laredo was designed to help
generate county revenue.156 The defendant (LPS), a competitor
that relied on scraping, amalgamated a variety of real property
data. Like individual users of Laredo, LPS used Laredo to view
public records online.157 LPS then developed a program to
electronically capture the public records from Laredo and
download them without having to pay fees to local counties.158
LPS also sold the records to its own customers, undercutting
Laredo’s ability to help counties generate revenue.159 While LPS
had no contract with Laredo to prohibit such scraping,160 as soon
as Fidlar learned of LPS’s scraping, Fidlar notified LPS that it
was using its data unlawfully under the CFAA.161 Fidlar also
technically upgraded Laredo just to prevent further scraping.162
The court held that LPS was liable under the CFAA because its
scraper was designed to circumvent Laredo’s intended functions
and bypass various user controls.163 Further, the scraper
impaired Laredo’s integrity, causing it significant damage.164
Fidlar Technologies was an important case because the
court, in addition to analyzing why scrapers must violate a code
barrier in order to exceed authorization, spent significant time
determining Fidlar’s damages.165 While damages under the CFAA
Id. at 933.
Fidlar Techs. v. LPS Real Estate Data Sols., Inc., No. 4:13-cv-4021-SLDJAG, 2013 WL 5973938 (C.D. Ill. Nov. 8, 2013).
155 Id. at *1.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id. at *2-3.
159 Id. at *3.
160 Id. at *2-3.
161 Fidlar also communicated with each county that was affected by LPS’s
harvesting activities, and consequently, many of these counties unilaterally terminated
their accounts with LPS or upgraded their Laredo software in order to hinder LPS’s
harvesting activity. Id. at *4-5.
162 Id.
163 Id. at *7-8.
164 Id.
165 Id.
153
154
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have not been as contentious as the term authorization,166 in
Fidlar, the plaintiff brought a parallel claim of trespass to
chattels.167 Indeed, many scraping cases have been brought under
this common law tort, and courts have increasingly applied it in
the modern digital context. The jurisprudence of scraping cases
brought under trespass to chattels is important to understand
because it has allowed many data hosts to recover damages
caused by harmful scrapers.
B.

When Scrapers Do Not Breach Codes: Alternative
Remedies in Trespass to Chattels

Liability for trespass to chattels arises when one
intentionally takes or intermeddles with a chattel that is
possessed by another.168 Since the 1990s, this tort has been
applied to cases involving devices that automatically overuse
phone and email networks and diminish their functionality.169
More recently, the tort has been used in scraping cases.170 To
establish a trespass to chattels claim, data hosts have to show
that they were dispossessed of their chattel, that their chattel’s
condition, quality, or value was impaired, or that they were
“deprived of the use of their chattel for a substantial time.”171
166 Catherine M. Sharkey, Trespass Torts and Self-Help for an Electronic Age,
44 TULSA L. REV. 677, 695 (2009) (discussing Patricia Bellia and Richard Epstein’s
similar opinions).
167 Fidlar, 2013 WL 5973938, at *9-10.
168 Sharkey, supra note 166, at 678 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 217 (1965) (“A trespass to chattel may be committed by intentionally (a)
dispossessing another of the chattel, or (b) using or intermeddling with a chattel in the
possession of another.”)).
169 See, e.g., Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie Inc., No. C 98-20064 JW, 1998
WL 388389, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 1998) (involving a device that automatically sent
spam emails to thousands of Hotmail users); Am. Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F.
Supp. 2d 444, 448 (E.D. Va. 1998) (involving a device that sent bulk unsolicited spam
advertisements to AOL customers); Am. Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548, 549
(E.D. Va. 1998) (involving a device that sent bulk spam emails to AOL customers);
Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 471 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (involving
device that accessed Thrifty-Tel’s telephone system and generated massive number of
phone calls); CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1017-18
(S.D. Ohio 1997) (involving device that sent substantial volume of unsolicited email
advertisements to CompuServe subscribers).
170 See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 396-97 (2d Cir.
2004) (involving device that scraped competitor’s website to solicit additional business
and engage in email and phone marketing); EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc.,
274 F.3d 577, 579 (1st Cir. 2001) (involving scraping device that automatically gleaned
pricing information from competitor’s website); Fidlar Techs. v. LPS Real Estate Data
Solutions, Inc., No. 4:13-CV-4021-SLD-JAG, 2013 WL 5973938, at *3 (C.D. Ill. Nov. 8,
2013) (involving scraper that aggregated nondownloadable data from software
program); eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1062 (N.D. Cal. 2000)
(involving scraper that aggregated auction data from competing website).
171 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
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When trespass to chattels was first used in the digital
context, courts were willing to apply the doctrine even when there
was no physical damage to digital property.172 As scholars began
to warn about the dangers of applying the doctrine too
expansively,173 however, certain courts began to find that without
showing physical harm, data hosts could not make out a claim.174
Although a few courts adopted this view and dismissed trespass
to chattels claims where there was no proof of tangible harm, in
most courts, trespass to chattels is a viable alternate legal route
for data hosts to pursue scraping claims. Adopting a code-based
standard for scraping claims brought under the CFAA will not
significantly prejudice data hosts that do not erect code barriers
because data hosts that are victims of harmful scraping can still
recover damages under trespass to chattels.
1. Early Digital Trespass: Phone and Email Cases
Before the emergence of scraping cases, trespass to
chattels was applied in cases with telephone networks and email
systems. In Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek,175 phone hackers used
computer software to hack into a phone and generate hundreds of
thousands of calls that denied other users access to those phone
lines. Thrifty-Tel alleged that Bezenek’s conduct constituted
trespass to chattels. The court agreed, finding that the
computerized telephone network was a chattel, and by
overburdening the network, Bezeneck intermeddled with ThriftyTel’s use of its chattel, thereby causing it injury.176
172 See, e.g., Thrifty-Tel, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 472, 475, 477 (holding that there
was sufficient damage due to overburdening an electronic phone system, which caused
a diminution of its quality, condition, or value); CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1025-27
(finding that there was sufficient damage to an email network).
173 See, e.g., Sharkey, supra note 166 (proposing that self-help remedies be a
precondition for data hosts to seek legal enforcement of cyberproperty rights, even
though they are not required for land owners to seek enforcement of land property
rights, in order to distinguish the two doctrines and cabin the expansiveness of the
digital tort); Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital
Anticommons, 91 CAL. L. REV. 439, 502 (2003) (identifying a trend towards increased
private ownership in the Internet domain and warning that such increased private
ownership could lead to a tragedy of the anticommons, whereby “multiple parties can
prevent others from using a given resource so that no one has an effective right of
use”); Greg Lastowka, Decoding Cyberproperty, 40 IND. L. REV. 23, 71 (2007)
(advocating for less robust cyberproperty rights and noting that “[w]e have no reason to
trust that creating broad legal rights of exclusion online will lead us to better social
outcomes and good reason to believe that cyberproperty rights might well, under the
cover of private property, lead to significant harms”).
174 See, e.g., Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.Com, Inc., No. CV997654HLHVBKX,
2003 WL 21406289, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2003).
175 Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
176 Id. at 472-73.
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In subsequent email spamming cases,177 courts continued
to apply a modern notion of trespass to chattels; in most
instances, the plaintiff claimed that a digital device accessed its
personal property without authorization.178 For damages, these
courts generally only required a modest showing that the email
network suffered some diminution of its quality, condition, or
value as a result of the spammer’s conduct, even if the damages
were not quantifiable.179 For example, in CompuServe, Inc. v.
Cyber Promotions, CompuServe, a major online provider of email
services, brought a trespass to chattels claim against Cyber
Promotions.180 Cyber Promotions was a business that sent
massive amounts of unsolicited email advertisements and used
CompuServe’s email database to send such advertisements to
CompuServe’s subscribers.181 The court, after analyzing the
evolution of trespass to chattels in the digital context, agreed with
CompuServe and granted its request for a temporary injunction
against Cyber Promotions.182 Otherwise, the court found,
CompuServe’s email system would be at risk of irreparable
damage, not only from the diminished physical disk space and
processing power of CompuServe’s systems,183 but also from the
threat to CompuServe’s “business reputation and goodwill with
its customers.”184 Thus, as in Thrifty-Tel, the court showed that it
was willing to assess remedies based on nonphysical damage.

177 See, e.g., Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie Inc., No. C 98-20064 JW, 1998
WL 388389 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 1998); Am. Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d
444 (E.D. Va. 1998); Am. Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548 (E.D. Va. 1998);
CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
178 “Trespass to chattels has evolved from its original common law application,
concerning primarily the asportation of another’s tangible property, to include the
unauthorized use of personal property.” CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1020.
179 Id. at 1022.
180 Id. at 1017.
181 Id. at 1018-19.
182 Id. at 1027.
183

To the extent that defendants’ multitudinous electronic mailings demand the disk
space and drain the processing power of plaintiff’s computer equipment, those
resources are not available to serve CompuServe subscribers. Therefore, the value
of that equipment to CompuServe is diminished even though it is not physically
damaged by defendants’ conduct.
Id. at 1022.

184 Id. at 1023; Patricia L. Bellia, Defending Cyberproperty, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV.
2164, 2176 (2004).
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2. Modern Digital Trespass: The Scraping Cases
The first major application of trespass to chattels in a
scraping case was in 2000 in eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc.185 In
that case, eBay, a well-known auction website, sought to enjoin
Bidder’s Edge (BE), a company that utilized a scraper to list eBay’s
auction items on its own site.186 eBay based its trespass to chattels
argument on its user agreement,187 telephone conversations with
BE,188 cease-and-desist letters in which it told BE to discontinue
scraping,189 and attempts to block BE’s IP addresses.190 The court
held that BE was liable under trespass to chattels for
intermeddling with eBay’s servers without authorization and free
riding on the time, effort, and money that eBay had invested to
create its system.191 The court expressed concerned that “[i]f BE’s
activity . . . [were] allowed to continue unchecked, it would
encourage other auction aggregators to engage in similar
recursive searching of the eBay system such that eBay would
suffer irreparable harm from reduced system performance,
system unavailability, or data losses.”192
Two subsequent cases that considered trespass to
chattels in a similar manner were Oyster Software v. Forms
Processing, Inc.193 and Southwest Airlines v. FareChase, Inc.194
In Oyster, a scraper copied data from Oyster’s website, and
Forms Processing used the data on its own site. Relying on
Bidder’s Edge and CompuServe’s standard that interference
need not be more than negligible, a district court for the
Central District of California declined to dismiss Oyster’s claim
against Forms Processing for misusing its data.195
Similarly, in Southwest Airlines v. FareChase, Inc.,
Southwest Airlines alleged that it suffered damages from being
scraped by a company (FareChase) that gleaned flight
information from its website.196 Even though Southwest did not
185 eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000);
Fibbe, supra note 58, at 1014.
186 Bidder’s Edge, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1058, 1063.
187 Id. at 1060.
188 Id. at 1062.
189 Id.
190 Indeed, “eBay had blocked a total of 169 IP addresses it believed BE was
using to query eBay’s system.” But “BE elected to continue crawling eBay’s site by
using proxy servers to evade eBay’s IP blocks.” Id. at 1062-63.
191 Id. at 1063, 1069-70.
192 Id. at 1066.
193 Oyster Software, Inc. v. Forms Processing, Inc., No. C-00-0724 JCS, 2001
WL 1736382 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2001).
194 Sw. Airlines Co. v. FareChase, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 2d 435 (N.D. Tex. 2004).
195 Oyster Software, 2001 WL 1736382, at *13.
196 Sw. Airlines, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 436.
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prove that it endured physical harm or deprivation, the court
held that FareChase’s use of a scraper to glean Southwest’s
flight information was unauthorized, as it deceived consumers
who purchased tickets through FareChase’s website but
mistakenly believed that they had contracted with Southwest.197
Thus, the court held that FareChase’s scraping wrongfully
interfered with Southwest’s use and possession of its site.198
Essentially, the court implied that because FareChase
knowingly accessed Southwest’s data without its consent, this
alone was an adequate basis for damages.199
This line of modern trespass to chattels cases shows
courts’ openness to assessing damages based on harms that are
difficult to quantify, such as data hosts’ devalued investments
in their websites, scraper users’ ability to free ride on data
hosts’ investments, and data hosts’ diminished ability to use
their sites if they slow down or crash due to scraping. Although
a few courts have refrained from flexible damages assessments,
the majority of courts allow plaintiffs to plead and recover for
trespass to chattels under a range of damages theories.
3. A Negligible Bump in the Road to Adopting a Code
In 2003, in light of a surge of scholarly criticism against
applying trespass to chattels to digital property, courts began
to find that scraper users could not be liable unless their
scraper physically interfered with the use or operation of the
computer.200 For example, in Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com,
Inc., a district court for the Central District of California did
not find a scraper liable for trespass to chattels and rejected
the argument that “mere use of a spider to enter a publicly
available web site to gather information, without more, is
sufficient to fulfill the harm requirement.”201 Later that year,
the Supreme Court of California reached a similar decision in
Intel v. Hamidi.202 There, a former employee sent numerous
disruptive email messages to current Intel employees but did
not circumvent any technical security or damage the computer
Id. at 442.
Id.
199 Id. (“Additionally, the Court concludes Southwest has arguably alleged
damage; the question of whether the damage is actual or physical, or whether the
interference is for a substantial period of time, is a fact question and inappropriate for
resolution in a motion to dismiss.”).
200 Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.Com, Inc., No. CV997654HLHVBKX, 2003 WL
21406289, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2003); Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 300 (Cal. 2003).
201 Ticketmaster, 2003 WL 21406289, at *3.
202 Hamidi, 71 P.3d at 300.
197
198
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systems in any physical manner.203 Even though Hamidi was
not a scraper case, the court’s reasoning in rejecting the
trespass to chattels claim was the same as its reasoning in
Ticketmaster—that in order for a plaintiff to successfully make
out a trespass to chattels claim, the plaintiff would need to
prove that the chattel was physically damaged.204
Although these two cases interpreted the damages
requirement for trespass to chattels narrowly, neither
substantially detracted from the viability of trespass to chattels
for harmful scraping cases. In Ticketmaster, the court was dealing
with a beneficial scraper, a price amalgamator, that was compiling
public pricing information available on Ticketmaster’s website
without breaching any technical code or damaging the site. In
fact, the price amalgamator was “deep linking” the prices, which
means that after scraping ticket prices from Ticketmaster’s site, it
would provide users with a hyperlink and transfer them directly
to the Ticketmaster site for purchase.205 And in Hamidi, the court
was not dealing with a scraper, but rather with an individual
whose emails disrupted work productivity.
In Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., a major decision in the
Second Circuit in 2007, the court affirmed that trespass to chattels
could still be used to bring a suit against harmful scrapers.206
Register.com was an issuer of Internet domain names and a seller
of web services, and Verio was a competitor that scraped
Register.com.207 Although Register.com shared its data with
certain members of its site, it expressly prohibited members from
using that data to solicit additional business.208 Verio scraped and
used Register.com’s data for email and phone marketing.209
Despite notices to cease such activities,210 Verio continued
scraping Register.com.211 When Register.com sued Verio for
trespass to chattels, Verio argued that its conduct never
physically harmed Register’s servers.212 But the district court
agreed that use deprivation could be considered harm under the
tort.213 Relying on Thrifty-Tel and older spamming cases, the
Id. at 299.
Id. at 300.
205 Ticketmaster, 2003 WL 21406289, at *1.
206 Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 395-96 (2d Cir. 2004).
207 Id.
208 Id. at 396.
209 Id. at 396-97.
210 Id. at 397.
211 Id. at 398.
212 Id. at 404.
213 “Verio’s use of search robots, consisting of software programs performing
multiple automated successive queries, consumed a significant portion of the capacity
of Register’s computer systems.” Id.
203
204
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Second Circuit reiterated the court’s concern in Bidder’s Edge
that if such scraping were permitted, it would likely encourage
other competitors to follow suit.214
The jurisprudence of scraping cases brought under
trespass to chattels shows that, on the whole, courts have been
flexible in constructing the damages requirement of this tort in
the modern digital context. Over the years, courts have assessed
damages, such as overburdened networks,215 lost space,216
threats to business reputation and goodwill with customers,217
threats of similar future conduct,218 intermeddling with servers
without authorization,219 “wrongful interference with . . . use or
possession,”220 and free riding on data hosts’ investments.221 Even
though the Ticketmaster and Hamidi courts were less flexible in
their damages determinations, those cases involved different
considerations than most harmful scraping cases and therefore
did not substantially detract from the viability of the trespass to
chattels regime as an alternative remedy for certain data
scraping cases.
Notably, trespass to chattels need not be considered a
substitute for or equivalent remedy to the CFAA. Because only
certain harmful scraping cases—those that involve a code
breach—should be brought under the CFAA in the first place,
trespass to chattels serves as a useful alternative legal avenue for
situations involving less pervasive scraping that still damages
data hosts. Since problems caused by scrapers will only
proliferate as society becomes more technologically dependent, it
is useful to have both the CFAA and trespass to chattels available
to deter harmful scrapers’ unlawful conduct.
CONCLUSION
In November 2014, the U.S. State Department became
the fourth government agency to announce a breach of its
computer systems in the span of just a few weeks.222 The hack,

Id.
Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 475, 477 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
216 CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1022, 1027
(S.D. Ohio 1997).
217 eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1066, 1072 (N.D.
Cal. 2000).
218 Id.
219 Id. at 1064.
220 Sw. Airlines Co. v. FareChase, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 2d 435, 442 (N.D. Tex. 2004).
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believed to have originated from Russia, forced the department
to temporarily shut down its email system and public
websites.223 The attack resembled one involving unclassified
computer systems at the White House the month before, which
also necessitated a temporary shutdown of its communications
systems.224 Although both of these government attacks were
ultimately contained, data breaches pose an increasingly grave
threat to our national security and privacy in all of its forms—
further demonstrating the need for a cohesive jurisprudence of
computer hacking laws.
The CFAA must be fortified if it is to remain Congress’s
premier antihacking computer fraud statute. The CFAA’s
original title and the initial Senate and House Reports indicate
that the intent behind the act was to combat crimes akin to
credit card theft, identity theft, grand fraud, larceny, false
pretenses, embezzlement, and similar offenses.225 All of these
are crimes of specific intent, indicating that the drafters of the
act desired for there to be a knowledge requirement. To fortify
the act, courts must preserve the drafters’ intent.
Users of beneficial scrapers are unlikely to intentionally
harm data hosts or expose confidential, protected data because
beneficial scrapers compile and reformat data that is already
publicly available. Even if data hosts occasionally suffer damage
from beneficial scrapers that did not intend to harm them, data
hosts can still seek recourse under the tort of trespass to chattels.
Since there are adequate remedies available to data hosts that
are scraped by harmful or beneficial scrapers, a code-based rule
derived from the narrow concept of authorization helps ensure
that users of beneficial scrapers are not unnecessarily swept
under the CFAA without having the requisite intent to access
protected data and harm data hosts.226 Such a rule would also
provide clear notice to scraper users of when they are committing
a federal crime, and it would create a workable standard for
federal courts to apply consistently. Thus, a code-based rule is the
best means to combat harmful scraping while protecting
beneficial scraping.
Adopting a narrow, code-based rule also does not
threaten unprotected data hosts if they are the victims of
department-targeted-by-hackers-in-4th-agency-computer-breach.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/
K4X9-QECE].
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225 Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984,
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scraping abuse. This is due to the availability of trespass to
chattels as an alternative claim when scraper users do not
breach a code barrier or deprive a data host of some use of or
value in its website. Because courts have flexibly construed
damages theories in cases brought under this tort, it
adequately fills the void in those situations where it would be
inappropriate to apply the CFAA.
In 2013, reports indicated that scraping accounts for
nearly a quarter of all Internet activity.227 Since scraping can be
both a beneficial and detrimental activity to society, its place in
data hacking jurisprudence needs to be clear. President Obama
announced to the nation in his 2015 State of the Union address
that data hacking legislation must account for the modern
security issues we face.228 One of the best ways to make data
hacking legislation more cohesive and effective is to clarify the
meaning of the CFAA’s ambiguous terminology once and for all
and adopt a narrow standard of authorization, particularly in the
scraping context. This will resolve a prolonged circuit split,
ameliorate problems of adequate notice for users of scrapers,
reduce the surplus of CFAA cases in federal courts, and allow the
CFAA to more effectively hold harmful scrapers and perilous data
hackers accountable, as it was originally intended to do.
Myra F. Din†

Rubin & Hu, supra note 21.
“And tonight, I urge this Congress to finally pass the legislation we need to better
meet the evolving threat of cyber attacks, combat identity theft, and protect our children’s
information.” President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2015),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/20/remarks-president-state-unionaddress-january-20-2015 [http://perma.cc/5BH7-TL56].
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